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This study examines carefully three major interventions carried out by the United Nations 
from 1991 to 1994. The interventions include Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, with much 
emphasis on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia. Edited by James Mayall, the study 
includes contributions from Mayall, Mats Berdal, Michael Leifer, Spyros Economides, 
Paul Taylor and Ioan Lewis.  
The need for such a study cannot be over emphasized. Since 1994, the United Nations 
still finds itself engaged in the former Yugoslavia (with a new focus on Kosovo), has 
been involved in Rwanda, deals with reoccurring problems in Iraq, and has carefully 
watched events unfold in Sudan. Although UN involvement in troubled areas has 
apparently slowed from its rapid pace of the early nineties, UN involvement will certainly 
continue well into the next century. More important, is Mayall's examination of the 
constraints that must be overcome if the UN Charter is to act as a constitution for 
international society. Certainly some of these issues have been addressed after the world 
witnessed the shameful television coverage of UNPROFOR soldiers shackled to 
streetlights. However, many problems still remain.  
Anyone could see that more than just peacekeepers were being chained to streetlights. 
Also bound was the optimistic UN role in a "New World order," which had been only 
recently borne out of the successes of the Gulf War. Mayall and his three selected UN 
interventions help the reader understand why UN peace-building efforts went from desert 
victory to almost an ignoble end on the streets of Sarajevo.  
In his introduction, Mayall discusses how improper implementation and drafting of 
mandates was a crucial issue in producing many difficulties faced by the UN in 
Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. In each study, the authors explain how 
UN forces on the ground confronted numerous mission changes based on unclear or 
changing mandates. Peacekeepers in Cambodia, for example, were suddenly confronted 
with running a national election. UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia had to deal with 
what Economidies and Taylor call "creeping escalation" as the mission went from 
peacekeeping to near-enforcement and eventually enforcement. UN forces in Somalia 
went from humanitarian efforts under Chapter VII to hunting Aideed or anyone else who 
attacked UN troops. Certainly these changes in mandate wouldn't be too serious if the UN 
force could adapt to the changing situation. However, this leads to another problem 
confronting UN interventions.  
The second issue brought out by Mayall lies in the fact that the stated goals of many 
mandates cannot be met because UN forces on the ground do not have the required 
resources. Also, sometimes contributing nations may have the resources, but do not have 
the national will to support the stated goals of a mandate. Efforts in Cambodia were 
hampered by a lack of linguists in some UN detachments and many deploying units did 
not have the support structure to effectively begin and sustain operations in a timely 
manner. Peacekeepers in Yugoslavia did not have the resources to adequately defend 
themselves or cover the required terrain to maintain peace. Finally, UN personnel in 
Somalia lacked area experts who could have helped prevent some mistakes made in 
administration and psyops efforts.  
In conclusion, the editor points out some obvious shortcoming, in UN intervention efforts 
and discusses a few others, such as intelligence (information) gathering systems, a 
doctrinal base to guide UN forces, clear cut command and control channels, and 
logistic/deployment planning. However, mandate creation/ enforcement along with 
resourcing and providing the will for the mandate were the greatest problems confronting 
the three operations examined in the study. Having the proper means to achieve the 
desired ends has always been a challenge in any type of military operation. For 
Clausewitz, it was how he judged a military commander as a genius. The title was only 
reserved for those few individuals who could achieve a desired end with very little 
means. It is clear that all too often, available resources fall well short of approved 
mandates thereby leaving a string of frustrated American, British and Canadian UN 
commanders trying to make much out of little. This problem is clearly drawn out in this 
study and is an important lesson learned as evidenced by NATO whose participation in 
Bosnia helped fill this gap of resources versus mandates.  
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